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9.1 Introduction
Little is generally known about Italian experience under the gold
standard, especially during the gold standardperiodbefore WorldWarI,
since Italy adhered to the standard only intermittently. The Italian-
language literature on the subject is mainly qualitative in nature, while
the English-language literature is virtually nonexistent. For a long time
the inadequacy or outright lack of data impeded progress. But relevant
statistics are now available and we intend to exploit them to remedy, at
least in part, this void.
Our strategy is to study the 1861-1914 period in light of what the
literature today considers to be the important issues; these are discussed
in the following section. Section 9.3 gives the readera briefhistory ofthe
period-abackgroundessentialfor adeeperappreciationofthe quantita-
tive evidence presented in section 9.4. The salient findings ofthe paper
are summarized in section 9.5. Some data not easily accessible are
appended to the paper.
9.2 Theoretical Issues
9.2.1 Hume versus the Monetary Approach to the
Balance of Payments (MAPA or Perfect Arbitrage)
Kreinin and Officer (1978, p. 10), in their survey of the monetary
approach to the balance of payments, remark that
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it is often suggested thatthe new monetary approach is the intellectual
grandchild of the price-specie-flow mechanism developed by David
Hume in the eighteenth century. Monetary flows are central to both
theories, and both regard external imbalances as self-correcting.
However, in the price-specie-flow mechanism, monetaryflows rectify
external disequilibria through their effect on relative commodity
prices. In contrast, the monetary approach views a stable demand for
money as the core of the mechanism, and relative commodity prices
play no role in the adjustment process. Price elasticities are therefore
considered irrelevant. In fact, some monetarists hypothesize that per-
fect international arbitrage ensures that one price will prevail interna-
tionally on all commodity and capital markets, so that no changes in
relative commodity prices are even possible-let alone necessary-for
international adjustment.
This distinction is fundamental and deserves close scrutiny. The world
of Hume is traditionally analyzed in a two-country setting. Assume that
an exogenous increase in the monetary gold stock takes place in country
A, the effect ofwhich is to raise, with a lag, the price level in A relative to
country B. The changing terms of trade cause A to run a trade-account
deficit matched by a surplus in country B. The deficit is financed by gold
moving from A to B. On the assumption that the authorities do not
sterilize gold flows, the trade imbalance produces a redistribution ofthe
world monetarygold stockwith the subsequenteffect, againwith alag, of
bringingtheprice level in A in line with theprice levelin B. Atthatpoint,
equilibrium is restored in the external accounts as well as in the money
markets. The world price level would be higher if the gold increase in A
represented an increase in the world supply of gold.
The original formulation places the entire stress of the adjustment
mechanism on the trade account. When capital is allowed to move, there
is less stress onthe trade account: the outflow ofcapital brought about by
the monetary shock reduces the adjustment in the trade account that
would have been required in the absence ofcapital movements. Several
testable implications of this theory emerge: (1) money-supply changes
affect the price level with a lag; (2) gold flows are a significant, if not
dominant, cause of variation of the domestic money supply; (3) the
domestic price level or its rate of change is inversely correlated with the
foreign price level or its rate ofchange; (4) there is a real exchange rate
that is serially correlated for relatively long periods of time; (5) a real
depreciation ofthe home currency improves the trade account, which in
turn reduces the real depreciation.
The version of the monetary approach that assumes perfect interna-
tional arbitrage (MAPA)-of which McCloskey and Zecher (1976) are
ardent proponents-departs from the Humean theory in a fundamental
way. Gold flows do not serve to realign country A's price level with the407 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
price level prevailingin countryB butto restoreequilibriumin themoney
market. Prices of(traded) commodities and assets are determined in the
world market. Each country is too small to have a lasting influence on its
own price level or interest rates. The law ofone price in goods and asset
marketsprevails. Goldflows are only oneofthe meansto enforce thelaw
of one price; other commodities move from one region to another but
gold flows may be quantitatively more relevant because transport costs
are smaller relative to bulkier and lower priced goods. The testable
implicationsofMAPAare: (1) purchasing-powerparityandinterest-rate
parityhold in theshortrun as well as in thelong run; (2) thetrade account
does not respond to changes in relative commodityprices, partly because
the law of one price prevents the emergence of such changes and more
fundamentally because spending decisions are influenced by changes in
money demand and supply only; (3) gold flows are a small source of
variation of the money stock, implying that changes in the domestic
component of the monetary base dominate gold flows.
9.2.2 The Demand for and Supply of Money
In both Hume and MAPAa stable demand for money, influenced by a
few variables and in a manner independent of the forces determining
money supply, plays an important role. In MAPA an increase in the
supplyofmoney relative to demandgenerates an excess ofspendingover
income whichleadsin turnto an outflow ofmoneythrough a deficit in the
balance ofpayments. Theend result is thatthe monetaryshock alters not
the total stock of money but its composition between domestic and
foreign source components. In Hume the same monetary shock instead
affects the total money stock, its composition, and the domestic price
level.
The two approaches diverge in five respects in their treatment of the
supply of money. First, Hume assigns a large role to gold in the money
stock process, while for MAPA the role of gold is small. Mo~e to the
point, a fractional gold-bullion standard gives the monetary authorities
the ability to create monetary-base liabilities against the acquisition of
domestic assets, be those claims on government or the private sector.
Second, for MAPA, foreign exchange is a significant component of
international reserves. ForHume this is not a basic consideration. Third,
for MAPA, neither authorities nor the so-called rules ofthe game playa
role, for gold flows as well as changes in foreign exchange are automati-
cally offset by opposite changes in the domestic source components. Ifa
presumptive case for sterilization by monetary authorities can be made,
can one discriminate changes in domestic source components of base
money that cause opposite movements in foreign source components
from sterilizationbehavior? Fourth, the two approachesdifferonthelink
between monetary policy in Italy and monetary policy in the other408 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
member-statesoftheLatinMonetaryUnion. Finally, thetwo approaches
assign different roles to the public and banks in the money-supply pro-
cess.
These issues are explored in some detail in the next two sections. We
first assess the evidence qualitatively as we guide the reader through the
relevant historical account, and subsequently more formally.
9.3 Historical Account
For brief periods in Italy, paper money was convertible at the official
pricein eithergoldorsilver.! Forthemostpart, fractional reserves ofgold
and silver bullion were held against paper money (i.e., the monetary
base) createdby banksofissue andthegovernment. Italydid notdevelop
a single monetary authority until 1926. Up to that time several banks,
legally permitted to issue notes, held metallic reserves.
Despitethefact thatItaly adoptedthegoldstandardintermittentlyand
for brief periods of time, her experience on the whole was not different
from what it would have been had she adhered to the standard through-
out, particularly from 1900 to 1913. The reason was that Italy's decision
makers were aware ofthe limits ofoperating on a paperstandard. Either
they operated responsibly without gold or pulled back from the brink
when acting irresponsibly. Briefly put, Italy was guided by the norm of
the gold standard.
9.3.1 Competition versus Monopoly of Issue
Upon becoming a unified nation in 1861, Italy inherited the financial
structures of the constituent states. Some ofthese states had banks that
possessed characteristics ofa central bank; others did not. In brief, there
were three banks whose currencies (coins and paper money) were legal
tender: theBancaNazionale (BN) operatingin PiedmontandGenoa, the
Banca Romana operating in Rome, and the Banca Nazionale Toscana,
operating in Tuscany; and six banks whose currency was fiduciary in the
strict sense of the word and thus not legal tender (i.e., its acceptance
depended on the trust ofeconomic agents): the Banco di Napoli and the
Banco di Sicilia, both operating in the Kingdom of the two Sicilies, the
BancaToscana di Credito perIe Industrie ed i Commerci d'Italia operat-
ing in Tuscany, the Banca degli Stati Parmensi operating in Parma, the
Stabilimento Mercantile di Venezia operating in Venice, and the Banca
Pontificia per Ie Quattro Legazioni operating in Bologna.
Two intellectual and political groups competedin Italy to give shape to
the country's monetary system. One supported more competition in
banking and, in particular, completefreedom ofcurrencyissue; theother
believed that the political and economic integration of Italy would be
enhancedby astrongsingle monetaryauthoritywhoseliabilitieswould be409 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
legal tender. The intellectual leaders of the liberal camp (in the English
tradition) were the economists Francesco Ferrara (1868), who became
minister offinance in 1867, and Antonio Garelli (1879); the leaderofthe
monopoly faction was the powerful Prime Minister Camillo Benzo di
Cavour.
2 In Parliament the procompetition group usually was stronger
than the monopoly-of-issue group.
Thetug ofwar between the two opposing camps undoubtedly explains
some of the haphazard, if not chaotic, development of banking. For
example, in the early 1860s, the senate approved a bill that would have
merged BN with the Banca Nazionale Toscana in a single bank ofissue,
butthelowerhouse ofParliamentdefeatedit. Numerous bills introduced
in Parliament would have enlarged the number o~ banks of issue.
In addition to the nine banks noted above, a number of firms and
individuals printed their own money. However, Parliament put a stop to
this practice in 1874 for fear that the bankruptcy of one of them would
endanger the entire banking system. In 1893 the Banca Romana failed.
BNandthetwo Tuscanbanksmergedtoform theBancad'Italia(Bankof
Italy). A law of 1894 prescribed that only the Bank of Italy, Banco di
Napoli, andBanco di Sicilia had the right to issue currency. This situation
lasted until 1926 when the Bank ofItaly finally emerged as the institution
with a monopoly of issue.
In short, though there was intellectual and political opposition to the
creation of a single central bank, the belief that a competitive industry
would overissue and the failure ofa large bank finally prevailed over the
opposition to a more centralized and legalistic structure.
9.3.2 The Bimetallic Standard and the Latin Monetary Union
In 1862, the newly elected Parliament of Italy approved a currency
reform closely resembling thatofFrance. Threeoptionswere opentothe
lawmakers: a gold standard, a silver standard, and a bimetallic standard.
Policymakerspreferredthe gold standard; so did BNwhich hadoperated
on that principle for several years. However, silver was the dominant
money in the South, Lombardy, and Venice. The split between North
andSouthwas further complicatedby thefact thatFrance, theclosest and
most important trading partner of Italy, was de jure on a bimetallic
standard. We stress de jurebecause de facto silver had disappearedfrom
circulation in 1848 following the gold discoveries in Australia, California,
and Russia? Atthe official rate ofexchange betweensilver andgold set at
a ratio of 15.5 to 1, silver was undervalued relative to market conditions.
Therefore, as predicted by Gresham's law, gold drove silver out of
circulation.
Confronted with the three possibilities, Parliament chose a formal
bimetallicstandardwheresilver nominallycould beexchangedfor gold at
the ratio of15.5 to 1, butin fact, bydiminishing thesilvercontentofsilver410 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
coins of denominations smaller than five lire ,4 established the ratio of
14.38 toI-aratio that was in line with prevailing market conditions. As
to silver coins of larger denominations used in international trade, the
1862 law provided for their issue only upon request; since the official
parity undervalued silver relative to the market, the provision served to
eliminate large-denomination silver coins. In this manner, Italian policy-
makers found a compromise between form and the realities of the
market.
The 1862 law also grantedlegal tenderto the coins ofBelgium, France,
and Switzerland. In 1865 Italy joined these countries to form the Latin
Monetary Union; their coins circulated freely in the union.
5 In effect, the
union decreed one common money without setting up a common mone-
tary policy.
Less than a year after the birth of the union, Italy in 1866 suspended
convertibility (see Martello 1881). Italian papermoney depreciated rela-
tive to gold which was exported to the rest ofthe Latin Monetary Union.
The world demand for gold, however, increased. In 1871 Germany
adopted a gold standard; the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and the
United States subsequently followed the German example. Concom-
itantly, the world demand for silver fell, while its supply rose due to new
discoveries in Nevada (De Cecco 1984). The market-exchange ratio of
silver for gold rose to 18 to 1in 1876. The Latin Monetary Union, which
overvalued silver, was flooded with the metal and by 1878 suspended the
free coinage ofsilver. Although the union had manifestly failed in retain-
ing a bimetallicstandard, it was formally kept alive for a few more years.
9.3.3 The First Inconvertibility Period, 1866--84
The state of public finances in Italy in the period from 1861 to 1865
quickly deteriorated (see Fratianni and Spinelli 1982, and figure 9.1).
Budget deficits, financed by an increase in public debt, rose over the five
years to about 6 percent of average national income. The external
accounts over the same period .did not fare any better: the cumulative
trade account represented about 4.5 percentofaverage national income.
At the start of 1866 the government announced another large budget
deficit, while another war against Austria was imminent. The market
perceived Italy to be a decided risk. Bond prices fell dramatically, more
so abroad than at home. Foreign-capital inflows dwindled, while domes-
tic capital moved massively abroad, in particular to Paris, to exploit the
large profit opportunities from arbitraging differences in bond prices
(Majorana 1893). The outflow ofgold was so large that some banks were
on the verge of bankruptcy. Even the dominant BN had to reduce its
portfolio ofearning assets to a ~inimum to cope with the liquidity drain.
On 1May 1866, the authorities decreedcorsoforzoso-the inconvertibil-
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Budget-deficit-to-GNP ratio, Italy, 1862-1913. Budget deficit
is the difference between government expenditures and rev-
enues as reconstructed in Pedone 1967, table A.l. Source:
GNP at current prices: ISTAT 1957, table 35.
The exchange rate between the lira and the French franc, and the
annual rate of change of the money stock, shown respectively in figures
9.2 and 9.3, capture the essence of the aforementioned events. The
money stock exploded in 1866; so did the exchange rate. The fact that
these two developments accompanied inconvertibility should not be a
surprise. Inconvertibility was brought about partly by the injudicious
fiscal policy of the government and partly by the war against Austria.
Inconvertibility benefited the government by enabling it to monetize the
deficit through direct borrowing from the banks of issue. The govern-
ment's action was backed by the export sector which perceived the
devaluation of the lira would stimulate the demand for their products.
The 1866 law granted the right to issue inconvertible notes not only
to BN and the two Tuscan banks, but also to the Bank of Naples, the
Bank of Sicily, and eventually (in 1870) the Roman Bank.
6 The major
beneficiary of the new law was BN, since its paper money became legal
tenderthroughout the nation. As a result ofthis provision, BNnotes sold
at a premium with respect to the paper money of the other five banks of
issue. To limit the issue, all six banks had to keep a gold and silver cover
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Lira-franc nominal exchange rate, 1866-1913. Source: Num-
ber of lire per French franc (ELF, table 9.A.l, col. 11), from
Borgatta 1933.
No soonerwas inconvertibility in effect than Parliament contemplated
a return to convertibility, creating a commission to study its feasibility
(Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta 1868-69). Parliament was so
eager to act on this matter that a law was passed in 1868--before the
commission even produced its report-setting the maximum issue ofBN
notes at 750 million lire-approximately the amount then in circulation.
The growth rate of the monetary base came to a halt in 1868 (see figure
9.3).
Monetary discipline lasted less than two years. Budget deficits then
rose again. The government desired to firiance the deficits by printing
money,7 so BN made loans directly to the Treasury. In return, BN was
authorized to print additional currency, ignoring the existing gold-cover
requirement. The consequence of these events may be gleaned from
figures 9.1 through 9.4. The growth rate of the monetary base took an
upward leap, as did the money stock. The lira depreciated drastically
against the French franc, reaching its highest level ofthe sample period.
The rate of inflation measured by the annual percentage change of the
consumerprice index which rose in 1871 reached an all-time peakin 1872
(see figure 9.4).
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Money and money base, annual percent change, 1862-1913.
The money base is equal to C. Sources: C = total currency
outstanding from De Mattia 1969, tables 5,6,7, and 14; D =
total bank deposits from De Mattia 1969, tables 2, 2a, 2b, and
23.
distress of the procompetitive contingent in Parliament. Thanks to their
efforts, in 1874 a law was passed designed to eliminate that advantage.
The legislation included the following provisions. First, the six banks of
issue were asked to repay the outstanding government indebtedness to
BN. The repaymentchangedthe ownershipofclaims onthegovernment.
Theeconomicmeaning ofthe transaction is thatBNsold its claims onthe
government to the other banks against an equivalent reduction of BN
notes in circulation and an equivalent increase of notes issued by the
other five banks. Therefore, while the aggregate amount of notes in
circulation did not change, the composition changed against BN notes
and in favor of the notes of the other five banks. Second, legal-tender
status was granted to the notes of all six banks. Third, the ceiling on
currencyissue was setatthreetimeseachbank'snetworth as oftheendof
1873.
8 Finally, the issue ofnotes by otherinstitutions was made unlawful.
Apparently, the procompetition faction had to concede this point in
return for a more equitable market-share arrangement among the six
banks of issue.
9
By 1874 the government managed to balance its budget (see figure
9.1). The return to fiscal discipline was reflected immediately in low
growth ofthe monetary base. The lira appreciated vis-a-vis the franc by414
15
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Fig. 9.4 Consumer price index, annual percent change, 1862-1913.
Source: Consumer price index (table 9.A.l, col. 8) from De
Mattia 1977, table 7.
5.5 percentintwo years. Therateofchangein theprice levelfell from +6
percent in 1873 to -16 percent in 1875, in response partly to domestic
deflation and partlyto the precipitous decline in world prices in 1874 (see
figure 9.4).
The fall in Italian prices paved the way for serious policy discussions
about a return to metallic convertibility. A bill was introduced in Parlia-
mentin 1880 to allow the governmentto borrowabroadupto644 million
lire to repay its indebtedness to the six banks of issue. The repayment
would enable the banks to keep reserves only in the form of precious
metals and would restore convertibility at a fixed price between paper
money and gold and/or silver.
Disinflationary expectations were thus promoted. Individuals shifted
from goods and real assets to money to capitalize on the anticipated
increase of purchasing power.
lO Domestic prices fell sharply in 1881 (see
figure 9.4). The appreciation of the lira was so pronounced that parity
with the franc was restored (cf. figure 9.2).
Parliament approved the bill on 1 April 1881. The ensuing sale of
governmentbondswas well received by the market. Since the bulkofthe
sale was to foreigners, Italy enjoyed a sizable capital flow. The proceeds
ofthe bondsalewere usedto repaythe loansextendedbythesix banksto415 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
the government. Currencywas takenoutofcirculation andthe monetary
base fell by 8 percent (cf. year 1888 in figure 9.3).
9.3.4 Return to Converbitility in 1884
On1March 1883, thegovernmentannouncedthatconvertibilitywould
be restored on 12 April 1884. Banks were given the option to convert
paper money into either gold or silver. Since the official exchange rate
betweensilver andgold hadremainedfixed at a ratio of14.38to 1andthe
marketexchange rate had risen above 18.5 to 1, convertibility tookplace
only in silver. Again, Gresham's law dictated that cheap money would
displace dear money. In addition, Gresham's law-in the context of a
world that was operating on a gold standard-impliedthatgold would be
exported and silver imported. In fact, from 1883 to 1885 the outflow of
gold coins from Italy rose from 9.2 to 101.3 million lire while imports of
silver coins increased from 50.7 to 103.7 million lire (De Mattia 1969,
table 10).
The course of public finances deteriorated again in the middle of the
1880s (see figure 9.1). The yield on Italian government bonds "Rendita
Italiana," quoted in Paris, was higher than its yield at home, reflecting
country risk as a factor affecting the market's valuation ofItalian bonds.
From 1883 to 1888 the lira depreciated marginally but continuously with
respect to the French franc. Banks ofissue raised the cost ofexchanging
silver for paper money (Supino 1929, p. 107), while overissuing notes-
the RomanBankwas the main culprit-inrelation to whatwas permitted
by law. In 1891 the government decided to legalize the currency in
circulation in contravention of the law. The aggregate ceiling for the
entire system was raised from 755 million to 1064 million lire, which
implied a reduction of the gold-silver cover from one-third to one-
quarter.
In 1892 the revelation of the illegal practices of the Roman Bank
precipitated a run on the bank that led to its failure. Widespread distrust
ofthe bankingsystemensued, reflected in a sharp depreciationofthe lira
on the exchange markets. Banca Nazionale (BN) merged with the two
Tuscan banks to strengthen its liquidity position and acquired the name
ofBancad'Italia(BI). Inthewake ofthemerger, Parliamentpassed a law
in 1893 which entrustedBIwith the task ofabsorbing the liabilities ofthe
defunct Roman Bank, providing for the substitution of BI notes for
Roman Bank notes. The law also made it unlawful for BI, Bank of
Naples, andBankofSicily to issue noteswithout direct supervision ofthe
state. "Excessive" circulationwas to be reducedoverseveralyears, while
the reserve requirement in bullion was to be raised to 40 percent.
ll
Finally, the law called for full convertibility.
Theeconomicessence ofthe 1893 law was thatmonetarydiscipline was416 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
postponed to the future (Majorana 1893). The call for convertibility was
assessed by the market to be wishful thinking. The continuous deprecia-
tion of the lira in the exchange markets tells the story very eloquently.
The government acknowledged what the market already knew in 1894
when Italy was back to corso forzoso (forced legal tender of the paper
currency).
9.3.5 The Second Inconvertibility Period, 1894-1913
This period was the most stable and prosperous of the entire sample
period. Budget deficits were first reduced and later converted into sur-
pluses (cf. figure 9.1). Monetarypolicy was consistently tight. The mone-
tary base grew at a rate below the rate ofgrowth ofoutput. Concomitant
with a world boomin economic activity, Italy's real outputgrew dramati-
cally-at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent from 1897 to 1913,
comparedto0.86 percentfor the period 1861 to 1896 (cf. figure 9.5). Not
surprisingly the lira started to appreciate vis-a-vis the franc in the mid-
1890s. By 1903 its rate of exchange fell within the gold points and
remained there until 1911. The period ended with World War I.
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Real GNP, 1862-1913 (millions of 1913 lire). Sources: Real
GNP = RYI(table9.A.l,col. 7), computedas GNPatcurrent
pricesdivided bythe GNPprice deflator, PYI: DeMattia1977,
table 7.417 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
First, the government budget appeared to be responsible for the vicissi-
tudes ofthe lira and Italy's alternate experiences with the gold standard.
Budgetdeficits causedthe abandonmentofthegoldstandardin 1866, the
monetaryexplosionof186&-67 and 1870-72, andthe returntoinconvert-
ibility in 1894. As the budget returned to equilibrium, Italy regained
monetaryandexchange-ratestability-aidedbyexceptional real growth.
Second,the banksofissuetendedtooverissue. Thegovernmentinduced,
tolerated, and legitimized excessive circulation, and possibly was re-
sponsible for unlawful note creation that ultimately led to the failure of
the Banca Romana. That banks preferredinconvertibility to convertibil-
ity and more than once tested the government to see how much they
could get awaywith is supported by some evidence (Supino 1925, p. viii).
Third,goldplayedanexplicit roleintheperiodupto 1866; afterwardsthe
system can be best described as a gold-silver-bullion standard. Fourth,
the historical account suggests that the monetary base is exogenous
relative to prices and income, in light of the tight link between budget
deficits and money creation. Finally, the gold standard was not a suf-
ficient conditionforstability. Politicianshadnodifficultiesinthrowing off
the straightjacket of the gold standard when it stood in the way of
financing large budget deficits. Onthe otherhand, theproper conduct of
fiscal and monetary affairs was sufficient to guarantee stability, whether
ornot the countrywas onthe gold standard. Indeed, the record indicates
thattheformal adoptionofa standardwas notveryimportant. Politicians
knew the limits of the paper standard and were willing to return to
judiciouspolicies afterperiodsoflaxity. Itis clear, for example, thatlittle
would have changed had Italy returned to a formal gold standard in the
first thirteen years of the twentieth century.12 This assessment of the
record permits us to treat statistically the periods of inconvertibility as
qualitatively similar to the periods of convertibility.
9.4 Evidence
Having outlined the principal theoretical issues in section 9.2 and the
broad historical facts in section 9.3, we are now ready to submit more
formal evidence concerning the process of money creation, the demand
for money, the interaction between the exchange rate and the difference
between the domestic and external price level, and more generally the
relative explanatory power of the two hypotheses of Hume and MAPA
about the balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism.
9.4.1 Data and Sources
The foresight of the Instituto Centrale di Statistica (1STAT) and the
Banca d'Italia made possible the quantitative aspect ofthis study. Some
time ago, these two institutions began a painstaking reconstruction of418 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
historical time series of the real and monetary sectors of the economy.
Three volumes are ofparticularimportance: one by 1STAT (1957) deals
for the most partwith real-sectordataandtwo byDeMattia (1969, 1977)
with monetary statistics. The work of De Mattia is of very fine quality,
certainly comparable to the reconstruction of monetary data made for
approximatelythesameperiodfor theUnitedStatesby Milton Friedman
and Anna Schwartz (1963).
Many ofthe time series we used-in particular those we think foreign
researchers may have difficulty finding-are shownin appendixA, which
also lists definitions and sources.
A few words are in order about the definition of the monetary base.
While currency holdings of the banking system (i.e., banks other than
banks ofissue) are known, deposits ofthe system with banks ofissue are
not. There is no way to assess the size ofthis measurement omission, but
qualitative accountssuggestit is small. Itfollows thatourdefinitionofthe
monetary base is equalto the outstandingstockofcurrency, and that the
reserve-deposit ratio is measured by currency holdings of the banking
system divided by all private-bank deposits.
9.4.2 The Money-Supply Process
We define the money stock M at time t as
(1)
where MB denotes the monetary base and m the multiplier which de-
pendsinverselyonthecurrency-depositratio (c), andthereserve-deposit
ratio (r) (cf. Brunner and Meltzer 1961; Friedman and Schwartz 1963;
Cagan 1965):
(2) 1+ Ct mt=--·
Ct + rt
The relative contribution ofm and MB to the growth ofthe money stock
is obtained directly from (1):





where a dot above the variable indicates the first difference ofits natural
logarithm. The first difference of the money multiplier, in turn, can be
decomposed as follows:
(4) m
t = [In mt- In (1 + Ct-l)]
(Ct-l + rt)
+ [
1n(1 + Ct-l) _ 1 ] n mt...:...l ,
(Ct-l + rt)(5)
(6)
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where the terms inside the two bracketed parentheses capture, respec-
tively, the contribution to mof the currency-deposit ratio and the re-
serve-deposit ratio.·Next, the growth rate ofthe monetary base depends
on the weighted average of the growth rates of the domestic- (BD) and
foreign- (IR) asset components of the consolidated balance sheet of the
banks of issue:
~MBt = (BD) ~BDt
MBt- 1 MB t-1 BDt- 1
+ (IR) ~IRt
(MB)t-1 IRt- 1
Finally, the growth rateoftheforeign componentreflects thegrowthrate
of metallic reserves (IRA) and foreign-exchange reserves (IRFE),
weighted by their initial relative shares:
~IRt = (IRA) ~IRAt
IRt- 1 IR t-1 IRt- 1
(IRFE) ~IRFEt + .
(IR)t-1 IRFEt- 1
Table9.1 shows the basicfacts ofthe processofmoney-supplycreation
during the sample period. The first three rows relate to equation (3):
column (2) gives the yearly sample means ofM, mand MB; column (3),
the long-run relative contributions ofmand MB to M; and column (4),
the short-run relative contributions. In the long run bothm andMB turn
out to be of roughly equal importance with a slight tendency for the
monetary base to dominate. In the short run-and this result is hardly
surprising-the multiplier rises in importance relative to MB (lines 1-3).
Changes in the currency-deposit ratio, in turn, dominate the short- as
well as the long-run behavior of the multiplier (lines 4-5).
The domestic component ofthe monetary base is at least as important
for the long-run growth of MB as the foreign component. In the short
run, however, matters change dramatically:. changes in BD affect MB
negatively, while changes in IR influence MB positively (lines 6-8).' A
more detailed breakdown ofthe data is provided in table 9.2 which pairs
yearly changes in BD and IR-the sort of evidence Nurkse (League of
Nations 1944) and later Bloomfield (1959) considered to determine
whethermonetaryauthoritiesfollowed theso-called rulesofthegame. In
the words of Nurkse:
Whenever gold flowed in, the central bank was expected to increase
thenationalcurrencysupply notonlythrough thepurchaseofthatgold
but also through the acquisition of additional domestic assets; and,
similarly, when gold flowed out, the central bank was supposed to



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.421 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
Table 9.2 Yearly Changes in Domestic and Foreign Component of the
Monetary Base, 1862-1914 (millions of lire)
Comove- Comove-
BD IR ment BD IR ment
1862 101.6 12.4 + 1891 -49.5 33.0
1863 -26.7 24.9 1892 15.1 4.5 +
1864 -31.8 -10.7 + 1893 44.8 -0.6
1865 12.5 3.9 + 1894 -118.1 90.0
1866 447.1 -26.9 1895 -63.4 -6.3 +
1867 198.7 15.5 + 1896 -58.0 28.6
1868 -81.3 91.4 1897 64.6 1.1 +
1869 -6.0 -0.2 + 1898 7.3 7.0 +
1870 39.3 20.1 + 1899 73.0 -5.1
1900 -52.0 17.6
1871 260.9 -24.5
1872 247.5 -16.8 1901 -26.4 26.6
1873 103.8 4.0 + 1902 -8.0 37.2
1874 27.5 -8.0 1903 -138.7 196.1
1875 103.8 -58.6 1904 7.1 23.0 +
1876 -1.0 5.6 1905 -123.1 190.6
1877 4.6 0.3 + 1906 43.3 144.8 +
1878 -15.6 1.5 1907 30.6 206.9 +
1879 53.1 -3.1 1908 -117.3 51.1
1880 -19.8 29.8 1909 17.3 17.2 +
1910 33.0 14.7 +
1881 -42.7 -40.2 +
1882 -211.6 20.9 1911 119.7 66.5 +
1883 -222.6 163.6 1912 -35.3 35.4
1884 1.3 48.5 + 1913 22.8 61.8 +
1885 52.8 -32.5 1914 639.0 79.6 +
1886 37.3 6.9 +
1887 -2.3 33.6
1888 -79.1 56.3
1889 40.7 3.3 +
1890 40.7 -29.1
Source: Table 9.1.
Notes: BD = domestic-asset component ofthe monetary base; IR = foreign-asset compo-
nent of the monetary base.
Thereare twenty-four instancesin which dBD and dIR move in the same
direction, and twenty-nine where they move in the opposite direction.
Abstractingfrom lags, this evidence would indicate, according to Nurkse
and Bloomfield, thatthefive banksofissue onthe whole contravenedthe
rules of the game through a policy ofsterilizing foreign-exchange flows.
However, these twenty-nine observations are also consistent with the
monetary theory of the balance of payments (both Hume and MAPA)
which predicts that autonomous increases (decreases) in BD cause out-
flows (inflows) of IR. And indeed there are several historical episodes422 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
that we can identify in support of the monetary hypothesis. Take, for
example, 1866, 1871, and 1872 when the government ran large budget
deficits that were monetized by the banks ofissue. The increases in BD
were clearly autonomous in the sense that they were not induced by
balance-of-payments considerations; yet they produced an outflow of
foreign reserves. These outflows are consistent with a condition ofexcess
supply in the domestic money market that finds its way abroad. As
another instance, consider 1882 and 1883 when the government deliber-
ately financed its deficits by borrowing abroad. The reduction in BD
cannot be interpreted as a violation ofthe rules ofthe game, but as a way
to restore equilibrium in the domestic money market, while at the same
time raising the ratio of foreign reserves to total base money. The key
point is that the occurrence of a negative correlation between the two
source componentsofthemonetarybasecannotbe interpretedtoutcourt
as evidence in favor ofthe reserve-sterilization hypothesis. The Nurkse-
Bloomfield test ignores the compensatory response of IR to changes in
BD. On the other hand, we do not pretend to shed light on the issue of
how much ofthe observed negative correlation between aIR and aBD is
attributableto "offset"behavioras opposedtosterilizationpractices. For
that we would require the specification and estimation of the reaction
function ofthe banks ofissue (as well as ofthe underlying macro model),
a task we are not ready to tackle.
13
Returning to table 9.1, we note that gold flows were the main long-run
driving force ofthe growth ofinternationalreserves; as a matteroffact, it
was not until 1893 that banks were allowed to count foreign exchange as
part of international reserves. But in the short run, once again, the
findings arequite different, with gold movementsaccountingfor less than
7 percent of changes in IR (lines 9-11).
Insum, thelong-rungrowthofthemoneystockcanbeexplainedbythe
fall in the currency-deposit ratio (with a relative contribution of 45
percent), the expansion of domestic credit (30 percent), and net inflows
ofgold (22 percent). The ratio cfalls from a value of7.8in 1861 to 0.35 in
1913, a steady decline interrupted by a sharp upswing in 1866-67 when
convertibility was suspended and in 1873 when metal coins appreciated
relative to papermoney and deposits. Thesecular decline ofcreflects the
corresponding secular fall in the cost of maintaining deposit balances
relative to currency. The contribution of BD to the growth of M is not
surprising in light ofsection 9.3. Table 9.3 presents, as summary, param-
eter estimates of money-supply functions for the entire period and the
subperiod 1895-1914. These results corroborate our earlier findings,
namely, that changes in the multiplier are influenced predominantly by
changesin candthattheelasticityofM with respecttoMBis unitary. The
estimates also suggest that the reserve-deposit ratio plays a more signifi-423 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914




Period Constant C ;-
m .004 -.292 -.022
1863-1914 (1.015) (-11.039) (-1.556)
-.001 -.644 -.046
1895-1914 (-1.679) (- 55.468) (-5.042)
M .008 -.270 -.018
1863-1914 (1.727) (-9.370) (-1.333)
-.001 -.618 -.039
















Source: See table 9.1.
Notes: m = moneymultiplier; M = moneystock; c = currencyratio; r = reserve ratio; MB
= monetary base; dot above a variable = first difference of its natural logarithm.
aFirst-order autocorrelation parameter (Cochrane-Orcutt estimation technique).
cant role in the money-supply process from 1895 to 1914 than in the
earlier period.
9.4.3 The Demand for Money
One of us (Spinelli) has demonstrated that there was a well-defined
demand-for-money function in Italy during the period under considera-
tion. However, in light ofan inadvertent error in the money-stock series
thatwas used andthe availabilityofan expandeddataset,we reestimated
the demand-for-money function. The model, the statistical procedure,
andfindings are discussedin appendixB. Onthewhole, theresults do not
change appreciably. Moneywas a "luxury" good overthesampleperiod,
a finding that is similar to Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) for the United
States (see figure 9.6). AsSylla points outin his comments onthis paper,
the "secularfall in velocityin Italy, as elsewhere, was inpart-perhapsin
great part-the result of more and more economic units and activities
becoming specialized, commercialized, and monetized. "14
9.4.4 Deviations from Purchasing-Power Parity
A cursory look at the lira-French franc exchange rate (EN) confirms
that for long periods of time this rate was not contained within the gold
points (figure 9.2). In fact, ENwas above the upper gold pointfrom 1866
to 1881 andfrom 1891 to 1901.
15 The question posedby this observationis
whether the evolution of EN reflects differences in the two countries'
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Fig. 9.6 Velocity of circulation, 1862-1913. Velocity is calculated as
GNP at current prices divided by M.
A short answer to this question is provided by examining the behavior
of the real exchange rate:
(7)
where
ER = the real exchange rate;
PF = the wholesale price index in France 1913 = 100;
PI = the wholesale price index in Italy 1913 = 100.
ER is plottedin figure 9.7. PPP holds if ER stays close to the parity line of
100. Upward sizable deviations from 100 imply a real depreciation ofthe
lira; downward deviations, a real appreciation. By assumption, the 1913
exchange rate is at PPP. The figure tells a lucid story. On the whole, PPP
did not hold. For a period of about twenty years, 1866-83, the lira was
systematically undervalued relative to PPP. Yet the path ofthe inflation
differential between Italy and France was very erratic (figure 9.8). The
lira again became undervalued from 1892 to 1894 in the wake of the
failure of the Roman Bank and of generalized mistrust of the banking
system. Only the 1900s can be characterized as approximating long-run
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Lira-franc real exchange rate, 1866-J913. Sources: Nominal
exchange rate (ELF) times French wholesale price index from
Mitchell 1978, divided by Italian wholesale price index: De
Mattia1977, table 7.
This assessment does not change when we regress changes in the log of
ENonchangesin thelog ofPFand PI (see table9.4). Boththeexplanatory
power of the hypothesis (R
2
) and the parameter estimates of the price
variables (which a priori should be equal to unity) provide grounds for
rejection. We performed modifications of the reported regressions-
constrained estimation on the two inflation variables as well as introduc-
ing distributedlags-whichhoweveryieldedno appreciable changeinthe
statistical results.
If PPP cannot explain the movement in the exchange rate, what can?
We considered the following model (see Meese and Rogoff 1981):
(8) EN=bo+bl (MI-MF)+b2 CYI-YF )
+ b3 (liis,I - liis,F) + b4 (liil,I - liil,F)
where + bs CAI + b6 CAF + e
EN = number of lire per French franc;
is = short-term interest rate;
il = long-term interest rate (a proxy for the anticipated inflation rate);
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Fig. 9.8 Italy-France inflation differential, 1863-1913. Percentage
changein the Italianwholesale price index (table9.A.l,col. 9)
minus percentage change in the French wholesale price index.
CA = current-account balance;
dot above a variable = first difference of its natural logarithm;
subscripts I and F = Italy, France.
Equation (8) is a testable implication ofa rathereclectic asset view ofthe
exchange rate, which incorporates the pure monetary model (b4 = bs =
b6 = 0) with short-run deviations from PPP (b5 = b6 = 0) and possibly
long-run deviations from PPP. The interested reader may refer to Meese
and Rogoffand the literature cited therein for a deeper discussion ofthe
theoretical and empirical issues underlying equation (8).
We fitted equation (8) for both the lira-French franc and the lira-
pound exchange rates for the period 1882-1913. The results were dis-
appointing: the parameterestimates were eitherinconsistent with theory
or statistically insignificant and often both. A possible difficulty with
equation (8) is that the sample period under consideration cannot be
characterized as a regime of flexible exchange rates. Often changes in
international reserves bore the brunt ofthe adjustment process. In light
of this consideration, we replaced EN with the composite variable,
measuring exchange market pressure,427 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914




vis-a-vis Period Constant Domestic Foreign R
2 D.W.
France 1867-1913 -.002 .173 -.053 .10 2.04
(-.522) (2.192) (-.539)
United Kingdom 1882-19131 .001 -.063 .026 .01 2.12
(.166) (-.666) (.170)
Sources: Lira-franc exchange rate: table 9.A.l, col. (11); lira-pound exchange rate: table
9.A.l, col. (12); wholesale price indexes: Italy, table9.A.l, col. (9); France, Mitchell 1978;
GNP deflator: Italy, table 9.A.l, col. (10); United Kingdom, Lewis 1978.
1Sample period was restricted by data limitations.
used by Girton and Roper (1977) in their study of post-World War II
Canada. The outcome was that the coefficient of the Italian-money
variable (in this case dBDIMB_ 1) turned out to be significant and ofthe
correct sign; for the other parameters, however, there was no improve-
ment. In sum, we can explain (marginally) more ofthe evolution of the
composite variable of EN, but the power of the explanation is far from
satisfactory.
Again, we pose the question: What drives the exchange rate? Are
nominal and real-exchange-rate changes largely unpredictable, or is
therea commonforce underlyingthelarge andpersistentdeviationsfrom
PPP? Our answer is that there is a common factor underlying the move-
ments of the real exchange rate and that this factor can be labelled for
short "country risk." More specifically, whenever financial markets per-
ceived that the Italian government was not following prudent fiscal and
monetarypolicies, the marketsrated Italian debtinstrumentsas less than
risk-free assets. PotentialownersofItalian debtinstruments demandeda
premium for the nonzero probability of a complete or partial default.
Consider a model ofinterest-rate parity (IRP) between debt instruments
of wide circulation:
(9) Dt= In (1 + if,t) - In (1 + iF,t)
+In E~+l-ln Et428 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
where
iI,t = yield on Italian bonds at time t (table 9.A.1, col. 13);
iF,t = yield on French bonds at time t (table 9.A.1, col. 14);
E~+ 1 = the rate of exchange for t + 1 expected at t;
Et = the rate of exchange at t (table 9.A.1, col. 11);
D measures deviations from IRP (when D = 0, IRP holds perfectly).
What is ofinterest here is not so much the absolute value ofD, which
can be influenced by transaction costs and differences in tax arrange-
ments, but how it changes over time. We interpret these changes as
changes in risk premia.
Equation (9) was computed using the yield on the Rendita Italiana
(table9.A.1, col. 13), a long-termgovernment bondthatwas tradedboth
athomeandabroad, especiallyin Paris; theyieldonacomparableFrench
governmentbond(table9.A.1,col. 14); andassumingperfectforesight in
the exchange market, i.e., In E~+1 = In Et+1.16 Four periods are of
interest: 1867 to 1884 when the lira was consistentlyundervalued relative
to PPP; 1885 to 1892when the nominal exchange rate was within the gold
points and the real exchange rate oscillated around parity; 1893 to 1901
when deviations from PPP again became pronounced; and finally 1902 to
1912 when the nominal exchange rate remained within the gold points
and the real exchange rate oscillated around parity. The yearly average
values for D for these four periods were 2.37 percentage points, 0.02,
1.95, and 0.58.
Clearly, large and persistent deviations from PPPwere associated with
Italian financial assets carrying a higher yield, inclusive ofexchange-rate
appreciation, than Frenchfinancial assets. These differences in D are too
large and their timing too coincident with the underlying real-exchange-
rate series to be explained by changes in transaction costs, exchange
control, ortax treatment. The underlyingforce-we posit-isthe chang-
ing perception by domestic and foreign markets ofItalian country risk.
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Additionalepisodicevidence can be marshalledin favor ofthe hypoth-
esis. In 1866 the lira depreciated by eight percentage points vis-a-vis the
French franc, yet the Italian price level was below the French one.
As noted in section 9.3, two important events took place in 1866: a
large budget deficit (figure 9.1) and the decision to make the lira incon-
vertible. In 1881 the nominal exchange rate appreciated suddenly (figure
9.2)-too suddenly to reflect changes in underlying competitiveness.
However, that was the year the Italian government decided to return
eventuallyto thegold standard. Theanticipation thatfiscal andmonetary
discipline would·be restored had an immediate impact on the exchange
markets. From 1891 to 1894 the lira depreciateddramatically; during this
period uncertainties about presumed banking malpractices culminated429 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
with the failure ofthe RomanBank. All these historical episodes confirm
the more general evidence presented above: It.aly was perceived for long
periods of time to be a substantial risk. That risk, in turn, was based on
investors' assessment ofItalian economic policy as imprudent enough to
justify a positive probability of default on its debt instruments.
An alternative explanation for the persistence ofdeviations from PPP
could be positive transaction costs thai would inhibit arbitrage in both
goods and securities markets. A variable risk premium that causes varia-
tions in the real exchange rate does not signify foregone opportunities to
arbitrage across goods or between assets and goods. The aim ofourtests
is to uncover a variable risk premium. They are silent concerning the
average transaction cost borne by a purchaser of Italian goods who
intends to resell them in France for profit. We have no facts about
transaction costs, but the downward trend in the real depreciation ofthe
lira from 1866 to 1883 is consistent with falling transaction costs. The
building of railroads, roads, and canals, the development of a merchant
marine, and the ongoing process ofcommercialization that took pace in
this period favor an explanation of declining transaction costs. In short,
our risk-premium hypothesis does not necessarily imply irrationality in
the goods market.
9.4.5 Causality Tests
So far we have identified the determinants of the money market and
the exchange rate. In particular, we have demonstrated that PPP did not
hold over the sample period, a fact that is more consistent with the
Humeanview ofthe adjustment mechanism than with MAPA's. We now
want to marshal additional evidence to discriminate more effectively
between the two hypotheses.
Table 9.5 contains summary information derived by applying Gran-
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The reported relationships are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level.430 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
should be read as follows: prewhitenedx, denotedx,causesprewhitened
z, denotedZ,in the s.ense thatpastvalues ofxexplaincurrentvalues ofz;
better than would ignoring past values ofx. Causality in this sense is a
matteroftiming relationships. The sign ~ indicates bidirectional causal-
ity; + or - refer to the sign of the significant cross-correlation coef-
ficient. Finally, the time subscripts denote the "causalitylag." Forexam-
ple, changes in the monetary base "cause" changes in the price level with
a lag of up to two years.
Several observations about the table are in order. First, the monetary
base is unresponsive to changes in output, prices, and exchange rates
while the converse does not hold. This evidence suggests that the supply
of money is independent of the forces that influence the demand for
money. Second, changes in domestic and foreign prices take up to two
years to affect gold and silver flows-the external imbalance (table 9.5,
part A). This evidence is consistent with the Humean adjustment pro-
cess. Finally, there is bidirectional causality between foreign and domes-
tic prices, a finding that is consistentwith the Humeanworld but not with
MAPA.
In the end the crucial difference between Hume and MAPA is that
while the latteremphasizeschangesin the moneystock as thevariable for
restoring equilibrium in the balance ofpayments, the former recognizes
also the importance ofrelative commodity'prices. This difference can be
tested by considering the following equation:
(10)
where
EDG = bo+ bi ESM+ b2 ER + b3 g
+ b4 T+ E,
EDG = excess demand for goods;
ESM = excess supply of money;
g = deviations from trend of real government expenditures;
T = deviations from trend of tax rate;
E = error term.
Assume that both Hume and MAPA share the commonvision thatgand
Thave a role to play in the excess demand for goods with b3 > 0 and b4 <
O. The dispute concerns b2 which is zero for MAPA and positive for
Hume. Note that the dispute is independent ofthe prevailing-exchange-
rate regime. At issue is the existence of a real as opposed to a nominal
exchange rate and its effect on the goods market. Hume posits that
deviations from PPP are part of the engine that drives the adjustment
mechanism. MAPA, instead, rules out such a mechanism and goes even
further by postulating that PPP holds beyond the "momentary" run. The
coefficient bi is positive. An increase in the domestic component of the431 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
monetary base creates excess supply in the money market which spills
over into the goods market by raising spending relative to income, which
in turn causes a deficit in the trade account. Forunchanged values ofER ,
g, and T, equilibrium in the balance of payments is restored when the
outflow of reserves restores equilibrium in the money market and in the
goods market.
We tested equation (10), using annual data for the period 1867-1914.
EDG was proxied by the log of real income minus the log of its trend
value; ESM by the residuals ofthe demand money (cf. table 9.A.2); ER
by the log oftherealexchange rateshownin figure 9.1;g by thelog ofreal
governmentexpendituresminus thelogofitstrendvalue; andTby thelog
ofthe ratio oftotaltaxes to nominal GNPminus the log ofits trendvalue.
BothgandTwere lagged one period. Theparameterestimates (absolute
I-values in parentheses) and other statistics of equation (10) are:
60 = - .007,61 = .38, 62 = .22,63 = - .002, 64 = - .33,
(.86) (2.14) (3.7) (.33) (6.13)
R
2 = .63, D.W. = 1.77,
which suggests thatthe dataare moreconsistentwiththeHumeanviewof
the adjustment mechanism than MAPA's. Not only is arbitrage activity
insufficient to equalize the lira price of Italian and French commodity
indexes, but changes in these indexes play an important role in reequili-
brating the external accounts.
9.5 Summary and Findings
Italy was not on the gold standardexcept for briefperiods oftime, and
for the most part the lira was inconvertible in either gold or silver, yet
fiscal and monetary policies in the latter part of the sample period,
especiallyin the 1900s, achievedstabilityofnominalmagnitudes. Indeed,
Italian experience did not differ on the whole from what it would have
been had the country adhered formally to the standard throughout.
Thelira-Frenchfranc exchange rate, representative ofotherexchange
ratios, floated moreoftenthannotandmoved above theuppergold point
in twenty-five out of forty-eight years, returning within the gold points
during the 1900s when the lira was inconvertible. Deviations from PPP
were sizable and long lasting. That persistence cannot be explained by
either an Italian inflation rate systematically higher than the world infla-
tion rateorby an expanded-assettheoryofexchange-rate determination.
Change in the valuation ofthe lira relative to PPP is best reconciled with
the existence of changing perceptions of country risk. Investors de-
manded a risk premium for holding Italian debt instruments as compen-
sation for a nonzero probability ofcompleteorpartial default. That risk,
in turn, emerged whenever the market perceived that Italy was engaging432 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
in imprudent fiscal and monetary policies; it disappeared when policies
reverted to normal. Our evidence in favor of a risk-premium hypothesis
does not necessarily imply irrationality in the goods market. Transaction
costs on Italian goods, while probably falling from 1866 to 1883, could
have been larger than implied by risk-premium calculations.
Deviations from PPP were found to have a considerable impact on the
goods market and hence on the trade account. The fact that changes in
the terms of trade could affect trade flows, and for that matter the very
existence ofthese changes, differentiates the Humeanview ofthe adjust-
ment mechanism from the perfect-international-arbitrage version ofthe
monetary theory of the balance of payments. The Italian evidence sup-
ports the former more than the latter. In favor of Hume, one may also
note the one- and two-year lag ofchanges in the Italian price level over
changes in the Italian monetary base and the two-year lag ofchanges in
gold flows over changes in the domestic and foreign price levels. On the
other hand, the strong form of Hume implies that gold flows are a
significant, if not dominant, cause of variations in the domestic money
supply. In fact, 45 percent of the long-run growth of the Italian money
stock from 1862 to 1914 can be traced to a fall in the currency-deposit-ra-
tio, 30 percent to expansion ofthe domestic component ofthe monetary
base, and only 22 percent to net inflows of gold. Over the short run, the
foreign component, being more volatile than the domestic component,
exerted a larger impact on the growth of the money stock.
Italy did nothave a monopoly bankofissue until 1926. Throughoutthe
period under study several banks were authorized by the government to
issue notes. Such an arrangement, however, did not prevent the govern-
ment from monetizing its deficits. Fiscal and monetary policies were
closely intertwined.
Yearly changes in the domestic component ofthe monetary base were
in the majority of the cases compensated by oposite changes in the
foreign component of the base. Nurkse and Bloomfield would consider
these observations as evidence thatthe authorities did notplay according
to the rules ofthe game. Our interpretation is that this negative correla-
tion is often more consistent with.causality running from dBD to dIR, as
implied by the monetary approach to the balance of payments, rather
than as the reaction of the authorities to dIR.
The Latin Monetary Union which Italy joined in 1865 was never an
effective constraint on Italian economic policy. Absence ofpolicy coor-
dination doomed the union to failure.
Moneywas as much a luxury good in Italy as it was in the UnitedStates
during the same period. Thedemand for real-cash balances responded to
changes in real permanent income with an elasticity of about 1.5. The
impact on desired real-cash holdings ofchanges in theopportunitycostof
holding such balances is statistically less clear.433 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
Appendix A
Table 9.A.l Basic Annual Data
Money Stock Bank-held Bank Metallic
(M) Currency Currency Deposits Reserves
(1) (C) (CB) (D) (IRA)
(2) - (3)+(4) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(millions of·lire)
1861 1179.0 1044.4 n.a. 134.6 118.0
1862 1337.9 1159.3 n.a. 178.6 130.4
1863 1371.5 1157.5 n.a. 214.0 155.3
1864 1336.0 1115.0 7.4 228.4 144.6
1865 1386.8 1131.4 9.0 264.4 148.5
1866 1859.5 1551.9 9.5 317.1 121.6
1867 2041.0 1766.1 15.9 290.8 137.1
1868 2089.7 1776.2 11.3 324.8 228.5
1869 2131.5 1770.0 12.5 374.0 228.3
1870 2432.7 1829.4 31.1 634.4 248.4
1871 2845.2 2065.8 38.6 818.0 223.9
1872 3317.0 2296.5 66.7 1087.2 207.1
1873 3339.6 2405.0 61.7 996.3 211.8
1874 3412.7 2423.7 62.4 1051.4 203.0
1875 3536.7 2468.9 55.5 1123.3 144.4
1876 3613.7 2473.5 57.7 1197.9 150.0
1877 3781.3 2478.4 57.6 1360.5 150.3
1878 3855.5 2464.3 55.3 1446.5 151.8
1879 3960.0 2514.3 67.6 1513.3 148.7
1880 4066.5 2524.2 81.8 1624.1 178.5
1881 4055.2 2441.3 80.4 1694.3 138.3
1882 3968.4 2250.6 61.8 1779.6 159.2
1883 4057.7 2191.2 74.1 1940.6 322.8
1884 4292.5 2241.0 76.7 2128.2 371.3
1885 4561.6 2261.3 85.5 2385.8 338.8
1886 4943.4 2305.5 87.4 2725.3 345.7
1887 5071.2 2336.8 95.4 2829.8 379.3
1888 5107.0 2314.0 106.4 2899.4 435.6
1889 5226.1 2358.0 83.5 2951.6 438.9
1890 5178.2 2369.6 78.2 2886.8 409.8
1891 5110.8 2353.1 80.4 2838.1 442.8
1892 5275.7 2372.7 71.0 2974.0 447.3
1893 5270.6 2416.9 64.9 2918.6 446.7
1894 5186.0 2388.8 67.9 2865.1 514.2
1895 5269.8 2319.1 60.8 3011.5 506.2
1896 5173.2 2289.3 65.0 2948.9 516.5
1897 5317.0 2355.0 73.3 3035.3 465.5
1898 5478.1 2369.3 74.5 3183.3 477.8
1899 5871.4 2437.2 83.8 3518.0 469.5
1900 6009.4 2402.8 78.0 3684.6 468.4
1901 6247.8 2403.0 81.6 3926.4 494.7
1902 6431.2 2432.1 87.6 4086.7 528.4
1903 6850.5 2489.5 97.5 4458.5 721.6434 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
Table 9.A.1 (continued)
Money Stock Bank-held Bank Metallic
(M) Currency Currency Deposits Reserves
(1) (C) (CB) (D) (IRA)
(2) - (3)+(4) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(millions of lire)
1904 7327.6 2520.1 102.9 4910.4 728.0
1905 7985.9 2587.6 129.6 5527.9 919.9
1906 8179.8 2775.7 134.8 5538.9 1068.6
1907 8960.3 3013.2 178.1 6125.2 1270.4
1908 9428.2 2947.0 189.4 6670.6 1314.7
1909 9984.5 2981.5 198.9 7201.9 1331.7
1910 10564.7 3029.2 198.7 7734.2 1344.6
1911 11160.7 3215.4 204.1 8149.4 1397.0
1912 11329.9 3215.5 231.9 8346.3 1433.9
1913 11849.3 3300.1 229.7 8778.9 1495.7
1914 12797.7 4018.7 276.1 9055.1 1532.3
Foreign-
Exchange Consumer Wholesale
Reserves Real GNP Price Price GNP
(IRFE) (RYI) Index Index Deflator
(millions (millions of (CPI) (WPI) (PYI)
of lire 1913 lire) (1913 = 100) (1913 = 100) (1913 = 100)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1861 84.1358 82.0 97.58 73.94
1862 87.1822 82.5 91.19 74.74
1863 85.3033 80.1 87.17 70.22
1864 86.4842 77.9 87.17 70.51
1865 87.9622 76.6 85.80 70.86
1866 91.8083 77.4 89.73 74.71
1867 97.4362 79.3 90.18 76.84
1868 99.9044 82.5 95.75 83.68
1869 103.0410 83.0 89.27 78.93
1870 103.4800 84.2 88.54 78.16
1871 108.5480 86.8 91.28 80.14
1872 108.3870 98.1 99.14 90.02
1873 113.1790 104.0 105.08 98.64
1874 110.8970 106.5 104.89 95.90
1875 114.4030 91.2 92.91 80.68
1876 113.0780 96.5 90.04 81.97
1877 113.7130 100.4 102.11 91.59
1878 114.8740 96.7 98.85 85.99
1879 115.0260 95.5 92.82 89.12
1880 119.4100 99.0 93.30 87.12
1881 111.2060 92.6 87.26 82.99
1882 117.5900 90.4 89.56 85.16
1883 115.8470 87.5 83.91 80.90
1884 116.4960 85.8 80.36 78.99
1885 117.9630 87.7 84.67 84.73




Reserves Real GNP Price Price GNP
(IRFE) (RYI) Index Index Deflator
(millions (millions of (CPI) (WPI) (PYI)
of lire 1913 lire) (1913 = 100) (1913 = 100) (1913 = 100)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1887 121.1680 87.4 79.41 79.27
1888 120.2110 88.5 80.75 78.77
1889 114.5710 90.0 85.44 83.66
1890 123.0170 93.2 87.64 85.33
1891 126.2310 92.9 85.25 87.34
1892 120.3140 92.1 81.03 82.06
1893 124.5200 90.1 75.96 80.67
1894 22.5 122.5690 89.7 73.75 78.56
1895 24.2 123.3080 89.2 77.59 80.40
1896 42.5 124.9400 88.8 78.16 79.07
1897 94.6 119.8550 88.6 76.63 80.03
1898 89.3 129.8240 89.2 78.74 83.96
1899 92.5 131.2540 87.8 80.75 83.03
1900 "111.2 137.2890 88.2 84.50 84.10
1901 111.5 144.9760 88.3 84.10 81.31
1902 115.0 140.8630 87.7 81.30 79.46
1903 117.9 148.4830 90.3 80.60 "83.08
1904 134.9 148.2080 91.4 77.00 82.29
1905 133.6 151.6760 91.5 80.30 82.63
1906 129.7 149.7520 93.2 83.30 88.60
1907 134.8 173.6640 97.6 89.80 88.32
1908 141.6 167.6950 96.6 87.40 86.86
1909 141.8 179.7000 93.9 88.10 88.67
1910 143.6 165.6680 96.5 88.20 94.17
1911 157.7 179.2430 98.9 95.30 96.69
1912 156.2 182.6290 99.8 102.60 99.42
1913 156.2 188.8500 100.0 100.00 100.00
1914 199.2 184.5260 100.0 95.80 98.94
No. of No. of Yield on Long-term
Lire Lire Government Bonds
per per (percent"per year)
French British
Franc Pound Italy France
(ELF) (ELUK) (RII) (RIF)
(11) (12) (13) (14)
1861 n.a. n.a. 6.97 4.38
1862 n.a. n.a. 7.26 4.28
1863 n.a. n.a. 7.09 4.39
1864 n.a. n.a. 7.55 4.54
1865 n.a. n.a. 7.83 4.42
1866 107.99 n.a. 9.23 4.55
1867 107.37 n.a. 9.66 4.41436 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
Table 9.A.l (continued)
No. of No. of Yield on Long-term
Lire Lire Government Bonds
per per (percent per year)
French British
Franc Pound Italy France
(ELF) (ELUK) (RII) (RIF)
(11) (12) (13) (14)
1868 109.82 n.a. 9.32 4.27
1869 103.94 n.a. 8.95 4.17
1870 104.50 n.a. 9.00 4.76
1871 105.35 n.a. 7.20 5.51
1872 108.66 n.a. 5.98 5.47
1873 114.20 n.a. 6.25 5.34
1874 112.25 n.a. 6.25 4.90
1875 108.27 n.a. 5.88 4.66
1876 108.47 n.a. 5.84 4.35
1877 109.63 n.a. 5.88 4.27
1878 109.42 n.a. 5.60 4.06
1879 111.19 n.a. 5.15 3.73
1880 110.53 n.a. 4.88 3.56
1881 100.28 25.40 4.87 3.54
1882 101.26 25.55 4.97 3.67
1883 99.15 25.03 4.97 3.83
1884 100.00 25.23 4.61 3.88
1885 100.38 25.38 4.56 3.79
1886 100.19 25.31 4.14 3.66
1887 100.82 25.54 4.46 3.78
1888 100.98 25.57 4.52 3.63
1889 100.67 25.42 4.58 3.51
1890 101.15 25.54 4.60 3.26
1891 101.55 25.65 4.71 3.18
1892 103.55 26.06 4.66 3.07
1893 107.97 27.19 4.63 3.10
1894 111.08 27.94 4.59 2.98
1895 105.57 26.58 4.37 2.96
1896 107.63 27.11 4.35 2.94
1897 105.14 26.45 4.18 2.90
1898 106.97 27.05 4.06 2.92
1899 107.32 27.07 4.01 2.98
1900 106.44 26.77 4.02 2.98
1901 104.30 26.25 3.97 2.96
1902 101.21 25.46 3.91 2.99
1903 99.95 25.15 3.91 3.06
1904 100.12 25.20 3.90 3.11
1905 99.94 25.14 3.82 3.03
1906 99.94 25.15 3.87 3.08
1907 99.97 25.18 3.69 3.16
1908 100.00 25.13 3.63 3.13
1909 100.42 25.29 3.61 3.07
1910 100.51 25.35 3.60 3.06437 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
Table 9.A.l (continued)
No. of No. of Yield on Long-term
Lire Lire Government Bonds
per per (percent per year)
French British
Franc Pound Italy France
(ELF) (ELUK) (RII) (RIF)
(11) (12) (13) (14)
1911 100.52 25.39 3.67 3.14
1912 100.93 25.47 3.60 3.27
1913 101.77 25.68 3.58 3.44
1914 n.a. 26.24 3.75 3.78
Sources: Col. (2), Del Mattia 1969, tables 5-7,14; col. (3), ibid., table 22; col. (4), ibid.,
tables 2, 2a, 2b, 23; col. (5), ibid., tables 11-15,19,23,26,28; col. (6), ibid., table 19; cols.
(7)-(10), De Mattia 1977, table 7; cols. (11)-(12), Borgatta1933; col. (13), DeMattia1969;
col. (14), De Mattia 1977, table 81.
Appendix B New Estimates ofthe
Demand for Money Function
Despite the research already done by one of us (Spinelli 1980) on the
demand for money in Italy for the period 1867-1965, three reasons were
persuasive for reestimating the function. First, our money-stock series
excludes currency held by banks whereas Spinelli included it by over-
sight. Second, Spinelli used the official discount rate as a measure ofthe
opportunitycost ofholding money. We have uncovered a long-term rate
of interest that is in principle superior to the discount rate. Third, we
wantedto ascertain thesensitivityofthedemand-for-moneyfunction toa
change in the sample period.
The model employed is that used by Spinelli (1980). It postulates that
the demand for money depends upon permanent income and the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money. Actual real-money balances adjust slowly
to the difference between actual and desired real balances; permanent
income is a weighted average of past actual values of income. Such a





Mi= a + bYi + cit; a, b > 0, C < 0;
Mt - Mt- 1 = a(Mi - Mt- 1) + ut; 0 < a ~ 1;
1";*- Yi-l = ~(1";- 1";~1); 0 < ~ ~ 1,
where M* is the desired stock of real-money balances, M is the actual
stock, y* and Y permanentand actual real income and i the proxyfor the438 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
Table 9.A.2
a b















Sources: Real income is GNP atconstant prices (RYI, table 9.A.l, col. 7). Real permanent
income is solved out by the model. The rate of interest is the yield on the long-term
government bonds Rendita Italiana (RII, table 9.A.l, col. 13).
opportunitycostofholdingmoney. Themodel is estimatedfor theperiod
1867-1914. Money data were centered at midyear and deflated by the
consumerpriceindex. Allrelevantvariablesweredeflatedby population.
A time trendwas added as a regressor; its coefficient is denoted by t. The
functional specification is logarithmic, except for the time variable. We
employed a nonlinear OLS estimation procedure which is subject to the
well-known single-equation bias. However, we believe this biasis quanti-
tatively small and not worth pursuing here (cf. Laidler 1977a). Calliari,
Spinelli, and Verga (1981) show that simultaneous-equations estimates
for Italy are about the same as single-equation ones.
The parameter estimates are given in table 9.A.2. The permanent-
income coefficient, b, is not significantly different from unity. To cor-
rectly evaluate the inflationary impact ofmonetary growth, however, we
cannot overlook the role ofthe time variable which is strongly significant
and has an elasticity of about 0.5.
The relative interest insensitivity of the demand for money confirms
the earlier results ofSpinelli (1980). The reader is cautioned not to draw
the conclusion that velocity is unresponsive to interest rates. Changes in
transitory income may be regarded as a proxy for interest-rate changes.
Totheextentthatthe demandfor moneyrespondstopermanentincome,
theestimates arecompatiblewith apositive relationshipexistingbetween
velocity and interest rates (cf. Laidler 1977b).
The adjustment between actual and desired money balances is com-
pleted within a year; learning takes longer.
Notes
1. The U.S. Commission of Gold and Silver Inquiry (U.S. Congress 1925, pp. 347-52)
has a compact but useful history of this period.
2. The economist R. Busacca (1870) also supported the monopoly thesis.
3. In addition to the increase in gold supply, the increase in the market price of silver
relative to gold possibly resulted from the shift of the source of European cotton imports
from the Civil War-ravaged United States to Far Eastern countries with silver standards
(De Mattia 1959).439 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
4. Gold lire and gold francs had equivalent gold content. Silver lire ofdenominations of
five and above and silver francs also had equivalent silver content.
5. There was a condition: Within two years after its secession from the union, a
member-state pledged to repurchase, with gold or foreign exchange, small-denomination
coins circulating outside its territory.
6. The five minor banks ofissue received BN notes for an amount equal to their metal
holdings. Since this transaction did not alter the aggregate amount ofcurrency in circula-
tion, the law can be explained as a governmental scheme to raise the market share ofBN,
thus paving the way for BN as the only bank of issue.
7. The then-Minister ofFinance Sella stated several times that so long as the prices of
bonds were low, it was preferable to monetize the deficits.
8. The net worth ofeach bank was as follows (in million lire): BN 450, Banca Nazionale
Toscana 63, BancaToscana di Credito 15, Banca Romana 45, Banco di Napoli 146.25, and
Banco di Sicilia 36.
9. The intended effects of the legislation were not fully realized. The national branch
network of BN and the regional character of the other five banks of issue preserved the
premium of BN notes over their notes.
10. The immediate impact ofa change in regime on the exchange rate is not limited to
the Italian experience. British economic history offers similar evidence.
11. Papermoney in circulationwas to be reducedfrom 1097 to 864 million lire. Asto the
reserve requirement, the law prescribed that gold had to account for 33 percent and silver
for 7percentofnote liabilities. Therewas no reserve requirementagainst depositliabilities.
12. This point is often stressed by Triffin (1964).
13. See Herringand Marston 1977 for an approachofthis sortappliedto Germanyofthe
1960s.
14. Velocity of circulation fell by 131 percent from 1861 to 1913 (figure 9.6).
15. The observationfor 1865, which we could not discover, is presumedto be 100. Inthe
empirical work this observation is omitted.
16. An obvious criticism is that a careful application ofequation (9) requires one-year
rather than long-term bonds. Unfortunately, we had no alternative to our procedure.
17. Lindert'sevidence (1969) ofasymmetries betweenthe interest differentials required
to attract funds to major money-market centers may be in agreement with ourhypothesis;
e.g., the interest differential required to attract funds from small countries to London was
greater than that required to attract funds to Paris. Our evidence suggests that ifLindert's
asymmetries incorporate differences in country risks, they are far from being constant over
time. Itmay well be thatFrance was preferred to Italy at all times-aninference consistent
with the data reported above-but this difference was not time independent. In sum, the
variabilityofLindert's asymmetriesis explained by avariable risk premiumagainst thelira.
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Comment Richard E. Sylla
FratianniandSpinelli'spaperin my view has two objectives. Thebroader
of the two objectives is to sketch the historical facts and quantitative
considerations that are pertinent to what might be called "A Monetary
History of Italy, 1861-1914." This sketch appears to be modeled on the
Monetary History ofFriedman and Schwartz. It is filled with fascinating
interpretations and hypotheses. One hopes that it is preliminary to a
full-length study. Thesecondobjective, morespecific andin keepingwith
the theme ofthis conference, is to ask the question, Does Italian experi-
ence, 1861-1914, support the classical analysis of Hume and others, or
does it lend more credence to the more recent "monetary approach"
developed by a number of writers but applied most prominently to
economichistoryin theworkofMcCloskey andZecher?Theanswerthat
Fratianni and Spinelli give is almost certain to attract a lot of scrutiny
because it runs counter to the results of many other tests of the two
theories. Their answer holds that at least for Italy in the period studied,
the price-specie-flow analysis is more supported than the monetary
approach and purchasing-power parity.
My comment covers each of the two objectives.
Italian Monetary History, 1861-1914
For most of the period, as Fratianni and Spinelli point out, Italy was
not on the gold (or silver, or bimetallic) standard in the strict sense
because Italians could not convert their paper bank notes and bank
deposits into gold (or silver) at fixed rates. Nonetheless, eve~ during the
long periods of inconvertibility (1866-84, 1894-1913) the Italian banks
were required by law to maintain a fractional specie cover for their note
issues (but not deposits), the fraction being one-third from 1866 to 1891,
one-quarter from 1891 to 1893, and two-fifths after 1893. Fratianni and
Spinelli describe the periods ofinconvertibility as a "gold-silver bullion
standard" in which the requirement of a specie cover for bank notes
exerted enough discipline (they presume) to allow the periods to be
treated as one for econometic analysis with the periods of de facto gold
standard (1861-66) and de facto silver standard (1884-94). Indeed, one
ofthe main lessons they draw from theirstudyofthe Italian experience is
that a standard orlack thereofis not very important: The "gold standard
is not a sufficient condition for stability" because
politicians had no difficulties in throwing off the straightjacket of the
gold standard when it stood in the way of financing large budget
deficits. On the other hand, the properconduct offiscal and monetary
Richard E. Sylla is professor of economics at North Carolina State University.443 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
affairs was sufficient to guarantee stability, whether or not the country
was on the gold standard ... little would have changed had Italy
returned to a formal gold standard in the first thirteen years of the
twentieth century. (P. 417)
Most economists and politicians probably would agree in general with
these views.
Fratianni and Spinelli's description and analysis of the proximate de-
terminants of the Italian money supply is a welcome addition to the
growing literature on quantitative monetary history. In the proximate-
determinantsframework, the long-term growth ofmoneyin Italywas the
result in roughly equal measures ofa rise in the monetary base and a rise
in the monetary-base multiplier. The base, defined as the currencystock,
grew in two ways, also of roughly equal importance. It grew first as the
banks issued currency to buy domestic assets, with issues to purchase the
governmentsecuritiesgeneratedby budgetdeficits beingthemainirregu-
larforce in this process, according to Fratianni and Spinelli. Andit grew,
secondly, as currency was issued to buy "foreign" assets, which were
mainly metallic reserves in the long run. Changes in the domestic and
foreign components ofthe base were in opposite directions in more than
half ofthe years studied, but Fratianni and Spinelli are not sure whether
this finding should be interpreted to mean that Italian banks sterilized
specie flows, thereby contravening the so-called rules of the game, or
whether the finding is an example of one source of base offsetting the
other, as either Humean or monetary-approach analysis might predict.
The lack of a central monetary authority and-most of the time-a
convertible currency raises questions about how applicable the rules of
the game were in Italy.
The money multiplier contributed almost as much as a rising base to
long-term money growth. The main reason for the rising multiplier was
thatthe Italianpublicchangedfrom holdingmostofits moneyin theform
of currency in 1861 to holding most of its money in the form of bank
deposits in 1913. The development of banking and a growing apprecia-
tion ofthe conveniences ofbank money were as characteristic ofItaly as
of other modernizing economies during the nineteenth century.
Whether money was a luxury in Italy, as Fratianni and Spinelli say is
implied by theiranalysis ofmoneydemand, may be doubted. Thesecular
fall of velocity in Italy, as elsewhere, was in part-perhaps in great
part-the result of more and more economic units and activities becom-
ing specialized, commercialized, and monetized. Economic historians
can teach economists that there are betterways to describe, for example,
the declining share of nontraded agricultural products in GNP in a
developing economy than as "a decline in velocity" or money as "lux-
ury." To teach these lessons, however, we have to do some hardworkon
the relative importance of production in the money-using and non-
money-using sectors of developing economies.444 Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli
Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP)
Since thelirawas notconvertible at a fixed rateintogoldfor mostofthe
1861-1914 period, it is hardly surprising that "for long periods of time
[the lira-French exchange] rate was not contained within the gold
points." The lira depreciated with respect to the franc when Italy aban-
doned convertibility because the politicians found that convertibility
impeded the ability of Italian banks to create new money to finance the
publicsector'sdeficit. Whensuspensionofconvertibilityallowed the new
money to be created, advocatesofPPPwould expect Italianprices to rise
relative toFrenchprices andthe exchange rate to rise in orderto equalize
exchange-adjusted prices in France an~ Italy. Fratianni and Spinelli say
that it didn't happen that way. There was a substantial real, not merely
nominal, depreciation ofthe lira from 1866 to 1883 and again from 1892
to 1894. As an aside one might note that this story, if true, confirms the
alleged irrational attachment ofthe French to gold: they kept their gold
and paid high French prices when they could have used the gold to buy
lira and then lira to buy lower-priced Italian products.
But is the story true? Fratianni and Spinelli argue that it is true, and
they attempt, after trying some tests that are inconclusive, to explain the
deviations from PPP by introducing the hypothesis of "country risk":
Wheneverfinancial marketsperceived thatthe Italiangovernmentwas
not following prudent fiscal and monetary policies, the markets rated
Italian debt instruments as less than risk-free assets. Potential owners
of Italian debt instruments demanded a premium for the nonzero
probability of a complete or partial default. (P. 427)
In support of their hypothesis they introduce evidence that "large and
persistent deviations from PPP are associated with Italianfinancial assets
carrying a higher yield, inclusive of exchange-rate appreciation, than
French financial assets."
Thisfinancialtheoryofdeviationsfrom PPPmeritscloser examination~
As the lira depreciated relative to the franc, allegedly because of the
Italian government's untrustworthy fiscal and monetary policies, one
would expect the franc price of Italian debt to fall accordingly to a new
equilibrium reflecting the new exchange rate. But Fratianni and Spinelli
appear to argue that the process of arbitrage didn't stop at this point.
Rather, the (all powerful?) French investors marked down the Italian
debtinstrumentsstill further be~ausetheyexpectedthe Italianpolicies to
become stillworse. WithinterestarbitrageonewouldpredictthatItalian-
government debt would decline in price (and yields would rise) in Italy.
Or, without instant arbitrage, the French would sell their Italian bonds
back to Italians until they fell enough in price to equalize the exchange-
adjusted prices in the two countries. In either case the French investors
supposedly enforce a real depreciation of the lira and create all those445 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
opportunities for French goods buyers to increase their incomes by
buying Italian goods.
This analysis is curious becauseit appearstoassume thattherationality
that characterizesFrenchinvestors is not sharedby Frenchgoods buyers.
If we assume, on the other hand, that rationality is evenly distributed
across French persons, then the case for deviations from PPP collapses.
Insuch circumstances, the suspicions ofFrenchinvestorswould leadonly
to a rise in yields onItaliandebt relative to yields onFrenchdebt, andthis
rise is precisely what the evidence brought forward by Fratianni and
Spinelli indicates. "Country risk" remains intact as an explanation of
relative interest-rate movements between the two countries, but it does
not seem to be able to account for deviations from PPP. Forcountry risk
toperformthelatterfeat, FratianniandSpinelli needto demonstratethat
Frenchgoods buyerswereirrationalandtheydo notdo this. Indeed, they
say very little about the trade account or even capital flows despite the
predictions that a more fully developed analysis of their country-risk
hypothesis generates with respect to these variables.
If PPP is not refuted by the country-risk hypothesis, how might one
account for the behaviorofthe real exchange ratecalculatedbyFratianni
and Spinelli? It is, of course, calculated by multiplying the nominal
lira-franc exchange rate by the ratio ofFrench to Italian wholesale price
indexes, with each index set at 100 in 1913. If one plots the two price
indexes, it becomes apparent that they are very close togetherfrom 1885
to 1913, but that before 1885 the French index is well above the Italian
one with a noticeable tendency for the two to converge in the 1870s and
early 1880s. The behavior ofthe two indexes is consistent with a hypoth-
esis that international transactions costs (the costs of transportation,
information, and so on) declined from the 1860s to the 1880s~ And, as a
matter of economic history, the completion of the Italian railroad net-
work in the 1880s, the decline of ocean freight rates, and the spread of
telegraphic and other information networks are often cited by historians
as key developments in this period. So the data are not inconsistent with
the view that Italianprices were world prices, adjusted to take account of
transactions costs.
Nonetheless, pending further study, an agnostic position on instan-
taneous PPP versus price-specie flow seems·warranted. The Granger-
Sims causality tests reported by Fratianni and Spinelli support the Hu-
mean approach, but now that such tests have been used to demonstrate
that fluctuations in U.S. GNP have caused variations in sunspots, one
might be a little skeptical (Sheehan and Grieves 1982). (Moreover,
Fratianni and Spinelli provide no information on the statistical signifi-
cance of the "causal relationships" in their table 9.5.) The results of
Fratianni and Spinelli's estimation of equation (10) are more trouble-
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significant coefficient on the real exchange rate indicates that (1) rises in
French wholesale prices, ceteris paribus, increased demand for Italian
goods; (2) rises in Italian wholesale prices, ceteris paribus, reduced
demand in Italy; and (3) rises in the nominal lira-franc exchange rate,
ceteris paribus, raised demand in Italy, presumably by making French
importsmorecostly. OnemaynotbepersuadedbyFratianniandSpinelli
that Italian goods were persistently undervaluedfor almost two decades,
but the authors at least cast doubt on the notion that instantaneous
arbitrage worked to bring about purchasing-power parity at all times in
Italy during the 1861-1914 period.
Reference
Sheehan, R. G. and R. Grieves. 1982. Sunspots and cycles: A test of
causation. Southern Economic Journal 48 (Jan.): 775-77.
General Discussion of Jonung
and Fratianni-Spinelli Papers
BRUNNER commented on an important paradox raised by the confer-
ence-that the rules of the game are frequently violated by most of the
participants but nevertheless the system functioned remarkably well and
that there was no major financial crisis within the system over thirty or
forty years. Hesubmittedthefollowing thoughtsonthisissue. Duringthe
gold standard era we observe a huge variety and array of adjustment
mechanisms involving allocation of resources between production and
trade. Also we observe changes in relative prices, changes in the alloca-
tion ofreal capital, changesin the shares oftraded and nontradedgoods,
changes involving long-term and short-termcapital, etc. All these opera-
tions and transactions involve a wide spectrum ofinformation and trans-
action costs, and they all occurin the contextofa variety and in response
to a variety of shocks-nominal shocks, real shocks, and shocks with
variable durations, i.e., more or less transitory shocks and more or less
permanent shocks. Shocks also occur in the context-and that is really
the basic theme for our purposes-in the context of well-established
expectationsthatthesystemwill bemaintained, thatthecentralbankwill
honor the gold standard and will honor the buying and selling ofgold at
the stipulated prices.
This context suggests that we would not always expect to see the
price-specie-flow mechanism involving relative price changes operate. In
the Dornbusch-Frenkel case, which is a classic case of real transitory
shocks, everybody would understand that a bad harvest is a transitory447 Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914
event. Under such circumstances we would not expect the Humean
mechanism to operate. We would see adjustment mechanisms that oper-
ate in the range of information and transactions costs that are very
small-exactly what we find in the Dornbusch-Frenkel piece.
On the other hand, in the case of more permanent phenomena of the
kind we saw in the gold standard era, in countries such as Sweden,
Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, where we observe a
massive transformation from a predominantly rural society to a highly
industrialized one, expressed by a similar pattern of real goals and
supplemented by a similar patternofmonetarygoals and no fiscal policy,
the price-specie-flow mechanism probably helped.
Thusit dependsvery much on the mixture ofshocks thatoccur, towhat
extent the various mechanisms operate, and whether the adjustment
takes place primarily in traded goods, financial markets, or substantial
changes in relative prices.
LINDERT, following his comment on Jonung's paper, made some re-
marks ontheself-destructionofasuccessful gold standard. His argument
was that if a gold standard were successful, the main visible symptom of
that success without any particular causal modeling would produce a
key-currency system. Thisoutcomeoccurs because people recognize that
some currencies are as good as gold; once they are as good as gold, why
ship or hold as a large share o( reserve backing a barren, unproductive,
and non-interest-earningmetal? Thus a successful gold standardwill lead
to a key-currency system.
But this phase is only the first, and if it were the only one, little more
would need to be said. The distinction between a key-currency system
and a gold system is merely semantic, which may be sufficient in a world
ofcontractenforcementanddepositinsurancewhere theperson, agency,
or nation issuing an obligation to the rest ofthe world must back it up in
the metallic way if a crunch comes.
However, asecondphasewould almostsurelyhave to come eventually
in any kind oftwentieth century that we can imagine. Soonerorlaterthe
key-currency country will be subjected to a foreign-sector shock thatwill
require deflation to hold the domestic money supply down to match the
externaldemandfor hermoney. Now iftheshockis moresevereandlong
lasting than say the 1847 harvest failure, would the key-currency-country
officials be expected to deflate enough to meet the shock? Lindert
answeredin the negative-soonerorlaterthe authorities will jettisonthe
system. With respect to the Bretton Woods system, with or without
Vietnam, America seemed headed on a path that would eventually
require her to waive the rules, e.g., as soon as there was a serious
deflationarybidimposedby thegold-rattlingFrenchandothers. Interwar
Britain came to a similar end. Such an outcome would have happened to
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world, there is reason to doubt how long Britain would have held out in
any case. As he (Lindert) has shown elsewhere, by 1913 Britain had
enormously high external liabilities relative to any measure of her gold
reserve, and that ratio looks high even by the post-World War II dollar
standard. Lindert argued that even without war in August 1914, there
were plenty of gathering clouds that would have made anyone question
convertibility. Thegrowingpublicawarenessofthe relevance ofadecline
in the moneysupplyonthe real economy, Lloyd George andthepeople's
budget, and a considerable shift in political power-all of these factors
would have made somebody question whether simple convertibility
would have dominated British policy forever. Moreover, a rising foreign
share of world output and foreign competition, in addition to domestic
pressure, would have led to the abandonment of full convertibility.
fRENKEL madeseveralcomments. Hereferredfirst toJonung's correla-
tions ofprices ofwheat andrye within Sweden and across countries. High
correlations, he suggested, do not necessarily imply unified markets.
Similar price movements might simply reflect a similar response to the
same climatic conditions in otherwise unconnected markets.
Frenkel's second remark concerned Fratianni's paper. He argued
again that the Humean approach, which places great weight on relative
price changes, and the purchasing-power-parityapproach, which permits
no such relative price changes, are both consistent with the monetary
approach to the balance of payments.
Frenkel'slastpointhadto do with interestparity. Fratianniattemptsto
relate deviations from purchasing-power parity to deviations from in-
terest-rate parity. His results indicate the existence of large deviations
from interest-rate parity. However, because he has no data on the for-
ward marketfor foreign exchange, he is forced to use the future spot rate
as proxy for the forward rate. Yet, on the basis of our experience with
forward marketsin the 1970s, we now know thatthe currentforward rate
can be a poor predictor ofthe future spot rate. As a matter offact, since
the spot rate follows approximately a random walk, the current forward
rate and the current spot rate are almost identical. Therefore, using the
future spot rate as the measure ofthe current forward rate may indicate
large deviations from interest parity that are not really there.
BORDO commented that the similarity between the experience ofItaly
and Argentina is striking. The parallel illustrates that the gold standard
onlyseemedtoworkwellfor relativelystableeconomies. Inresponseto a
conjecturemadeby PeterLindertthatthegold standardwouldhave been
abandoned because ofthe inevitable conflict between deflation and con-
vertibility, Bordo described a simple counterfactual experiment he had
conducted. He asked what would have been the behavior of the U.S.
price level and real output had she followed classical gold standard rules
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monetary base to the monetary gold stock, a fixed ratio of the U.S.
monetarygold stockto theworld monetarygold stock, a fixed ratio ofthe
world monetary gold stock to the world total gold stock, but allowing the
money multiplier to vary as it actually did, Bordoconstructed a hypothe-
tical gold-based U.S. money supply. He then used St. Louis-type price
and nominal-income equations to simulate the behavioroftheprice level
and real output since 1960 under a gold standard regime. He found
exactly what one would expect-the classical gold standard pattern ofa
stable trend in prices, surrounded by alternating shorterperiods ofinfla-
tion and deflation, and alternating short-run movements in real activity.
He conjectured that faced with such a pattern, the United States would
have inevitably left gold.
BARRO asked the authors whether they had attempted to include in
their money-demand functions measures ofthe extent ofmonetization?
JONUNG described his attempts to incorporate variables measuring
monetization,financial sophistication, andthegrowthofthewelfare state
in money-demand functions. These attempts employ, as a proxy for
monetization, the number ofinhabitants per bank office, which fell from
30,000 people per bank office in Sweden in 1871 to a low in 1922 with
4,500 people perbankoffice, and is now 5,500perbankoffice. A number
of other proxies for financial sophistication and monetization was used.
FRENKEL questioned whether inhabitants-per-bank-office is an ade-
quate measure of financial sophistication.
FRIEDMAN described his and Anna Schwartz's attempts to introduce a
measure offinancial sophistication in the determinationofthevelocity of
circulation in the United States before World War I. None of their
proxies proved successful.
Friedman also made a remark concerning the proper way to test
purchasing-power parity. He argued that it was not advisable to rely on
the correlation ofindividual prices, butthat it was necessary to construct
frequency distribution of prices. One might take the price of wheat in
Sweden and the price ofwheat in Great Britain and divide one price by
the other to generate a wheat exchange. Similarly, the ratio ofrye prices
could be used to generate a rye exchange. Taking as many identical
commodities as possible, one can construct a frequency distribution of
relative prices and study their behavior over time. This methodwould be
a way of constructing a measure of changes in the degree of market
integration over time.
MCCLOSKEY responded to Friedman's suggestions about purchasing-
power parity, pointing out that the origin ofmodern notions ofpurchas-
ing-power parity was the use by Cassel, Keynes, and others ofpurchas-
ing-power parity as a guide to the exchange rate governments should
adopt after exchange rates had been floating for a considerable period of
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McCloskey suggested that there can be drift in purchasing-power par-
ity for a number of different reasons. Even when arbitrage in traded
goods is highly efficient, nontraded goods cannot be directly arbitraged.
Productivity changes between traded and nontraded sectors can lead to
changesinequilibriumexchangeratesandin thepurchasing-power parity
index. By implication, under certain conditions purchasing-power parity
cannot be used as an accurate predictor of equilibrium exchange rates.
But this implication does not call the underlying concept into question.
Just as we hold constant income and tastes in any analysis ofdemand, so
too when we talk aboutpurchasing-powerparitywe shouldhold constant
other things that are themselves unaffected by the particular experiment
we are trying to perform. Forexample, with regard to Fratianni's paper,
McCloskey suggested that a problem with figure 9.7 is that the apparent
deviation from purchasing-power parity might well be explained on pro-
ductivity grounds and not bea deviationfrom purchasing-powerparityat
all.
KOCHIN emphasized the importance ofthe distinction between periods
of irresponsible fiscal policy and wartime exigencies. Borrowing during
wars will cause capitalinflows which would raise the purchasing powerof
the Italian lira against the French franc. This circumstance could explain
some of the deviations from purchasing-power parity observed in Fra-
tianni's paper.
JONUNG responded to PeterLindert's comments by suggesting that the
gold standard was beneficial for Sweden in a number of respects. In
particular, the standard made economic planning easier. In comparing
Sweden with Italy, Jonung emphasized the importance of recognizing
that Sweden was a smaller country than Italy. And Sweden was closely
connected to Great Britain. In such an environment, the relationship of
Swedento Britainis notunlike thatoftheStateofNewYorkto therestof
the United States.
FRATIANNI raised a number of issues in his reply. One dealt with
deviations from purchasing-power parity and the real exchange rate. He
suggested that some of the disagreement among discussants may be
terminological. What some label the real exchange rate, others label
deviations from purchasing-power parity. As Richard Sylla points out, a
numberoffactors can cause the equilibrium real exchange rate to change
over time: differences in productivity in Italy and France, changes in
production processes, and changes in tastes.
In response to Frenkel's comments, Fratianni suggested that he had
not attempted to exclude either the Humean mechanism or the perfect-
arbitrage version ofthe monetary approach to the balance ofpayments.
He agreed that the monetary approach does not rule out by definition
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emphasizesrelative prices; theother, changesin the level ofexpenditure.
The paper takes extreme versions ofthe two theories in order to delimit
the relevant issues as clearly as possible.
Fratianni also cautioned that the 1970s are a very different period than
the 1880s and 1890s. National economic policies and inflation rates differ
more now than then. Therefore it may not be advisable to generalize
concerning currentpolicy on the basis ofnineteenth-century experience.PART
IV. International
Linkages under
the Gold Standard